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Some Reflections on International Law and
Assassination Under the Schmitt Formula
W. Michael Reismant
Political murder has, alas, never gone out of vogue. Is its condemnation,
too, in retreat? From Iraq's invasion ofKuwait to the present, more than a few
commentators and government officials have observed that several hundred
thousand lives might have been spared if Saddam Hussein had been "re-
moved." Numerous reports have indicated that during the Gulf War Saddam
was a target-authorized at the highest levels-of Allied air strikes. Although
General Dugan was dismissed for broadcasting this objective, it appeared that
i'affaire Dugan was a case of dispatching the hapless messenger rather than
the message. The substance of Dugan's remarks drew scant protest in the
United Nations, in Congress or in the media. Nor was Saddam's case unique.
When the Reagan Administration mounted air strikes against Tripoli, it was
difficult to escape the impression that Colonel Qaddafi was a critical target.
When United States forces in Panama failed to lend substantial support to an
abortive coup against General Noriega, much criticism followed-of American
nonfeasance! All this, despite the fact that U.S. law prohibits assassination of
foreign leaders.
Major Schmitt courageously records these recent events and asks whether
they signal a change in national policy and whether changes have occurredwith
regard to the lawfulness of state-sponsored assassination in contemporary
international law. James Baker and I have recently published a study on
regulating covert action that deals briefly with the same question.1 Our book
observed that the United States maintains a substantial capacity for covert
action with more than forty years ofexplicit Congressional support. In the past
decade, much of the national debate on this subject concerned regulation of
such activities under domestic law-modes of authorization and oversight. We
felt it necessary to explore the extent to which, if at all, the contingencies for
which the United States is maintaining this capacity are lawful under interna-
tionallaw.
We examined the range of covert actions in the four strategic modes that
governments use: diplomatic, economic, ideological, and military. In each
mode, we tried to infer normative expectations existing in the past by reference
to conventional material, cases, and incidents. But we were careful to observe
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